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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION: A PHYSICIAN'S NEED FOR
REASSESSMENT
MARY JANE YARDLEY*
The significant increase in medical malpractice suits, as well as the
size of individual damage awards in the early seventies, produced what
was commonly referred to as a "malpractice crisis."' This trend surged
to record levels in 1975 and then began to decrease in 1976-1977.2
However, several commentators are predicting a new rash of malprac-
tice claims for the eighties.3 This increase has been attributed to vari-
ous factors,4 but physicians claim that one of the prime sources of this
escalation is the initiation of "unfounded" or frivolous lawsuits.5 In an
effort to curb this perceived medical malpractice crisis, the medical
community has resorted to a multifaceted counterattack. 6 Medical as-
sociations have sponsored legislation which penalizes the plaintiffs of
unfounded suits7 and have organized countersuit funds for physicians
* B.A. (1974), M.A. (1980), Special Education, Northeastern Illinois University; Candidate
for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1984.
1. See Comment, Countersuits to Legal and Medical Malpractice Actions: Any Chance for
Success? 65 MARQ. L. REV. 93 (1981). [hereinafter cited as Comment].
2. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, The Institute for
Civil Justice (1982). [hereinafter cited as Danzon].
3. Parker, Malicious Prosecution Liability of Plaintf's Counsel For An Unwarranted Medical
Malpractice Claims, 7 N. Ky. L. REV. 265 (1980). [hereinafter cited as Malicious Prosecution]. See
also Comment, supra note I in 1978; Danzon, supra note 2. Medical malpractice claims rose from
15,556 in 1977 to 17,238 in 1978 and the median severity per paid claim increased at an average
annual rate of roughly 30% between 1975-1978.
4. Numerous commentators have discussed the sources of the acceleration of malpractice
suits. See, e.g. Sepler, Professional Malpractice Litigation Crises.: Danger or Distortion? 15 Fo-
RUM 493, 506 (1980) (increase in all civil litigation); Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability
of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003,
1007 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum] (increase use of health services, utilization of more
modem sophisticated medical technology and the breakdown of traditional personal relationships
between doctor and patient). See also A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 402 (2d ed.
1978).
5. SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC.,
AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 73-88, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW RE-
PORT]. There is some disagreement on how many actual malpractice suits are "unfounded." See
Comment, supra note 1, at 95; Birnbaum, supra note 4 at 1016-17.
6. See HEW REPORT, supra note 5; Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits As Counterbalance to
Medical Malpractice Suits, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Adler].
7. Am. Med. News, June 20, 1980, at 21, col. 1; Nat'l. L. J., July 7, 1980, at 1, ol. 4. The
Florida Medical Association sponsored a bill requiring the losing party of a medical malpractice
action to pay all attorneys' fees. The bill became law in Florida on June 5, 1980. FLA. STAT.
§ 768.56 (1980).
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who become the victims of such litigation.8 Also, a nonprofit organiza-
tion was formed to develop public awareness and solutions for the
problems of frivolous malpractice suits.9
Similarly, the defendants of these actions have not passively ac-
cepted the onerous effects 0 of a baseless suit. Many physicians, believ-
ing they had been wrongfully sued, instituted countersuits against their
patients or their patients' attorney. " One such physician countersuit,
Pantone v. Demos,12 was in reaction to a suit for malpractice in which
two physicians were sued for negligence for medical treatment they did
not administer.' 3 The malpractice action against the physicians was
instituted after a patient died from complications encountered in the
course of childbirth.' 4 The malpractice suit against the two doctors al-
leged that they negligently failed to control the patient's vaginal bleed-
ing and to insure that blood was available to supplement her blood loss
during childbirth. Although both physicians had treated the patient on
the day she died, neither doctor had any contact or responsibility for
her care during childbirth.1
5
Despite the fact that neither physician was involved in any treat-
ment that contributed to the patient's death,' 6 both physicians were
8. State medical societies in California, Illinois and Michigan have established legal funds
to aid physicians in pursuing countersuits. 12 TRIAL, Sept. 1976, at 7. The American Medical
Society has also resolved that appropriate assistance should be given to such physicians. Smith,
Medical Malpractice: The Countersuit Fad, 12 TRIAL, Dec. 1976, at 44.
9. Lawyers Protecting People From Malicious and Unjustified Lawsuits, Inc., c/o 134 N.
LaSalle St., Suite 1100, Chicago, Illinois 60601.
10. The acceleration of medical malpractice suits has resulted in rapidly increasing malprac-
tice insurance costs of medical treatment and defensive medicine which results in a misallocation
of medical resources. See HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 12; Adler, supra note 6, at 52; Higgs,
Physician Countersuits-A Solution To The Malpractice Dilemma?, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 81 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Higgs].
11. Of the twenty-nine malicious prosecution cases examined for this note, all but nine were
brought against both the attorney who filed the original suit and his client. Two cases were
brought against the client only. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560, 418
N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897). Seven cases were com-
menced against the attorney only. Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1978); Stopka v. Lesser, 82 I11. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan.
271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So.
2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977); Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957
(Nev. 1980); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
12. 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978).
13. Id. at 330, 375 N.E.2d at 481.
14. Id.
15. Id. Dr. Pantone merely supervised the patient's chest X-ray examination upon admit-
tance. The second defendant, Dr. Swerdlow, performed two venous cutdowns without incident
prior to the delivery. Id.
16. Id.
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forced to defend a malpractice suit for over three years.' 7 However,
when the defendants sought relief from the damage to their profes-
sional reputation and increased malpractice insurance that arose from
defending the wrongful medical malpractice action, their suit was dis-
missed for failure to prove any special injury. '8 The Pantone court re-
fused "to extend the tort liability for the wrongful filing of a lawsuit
beyond the ambit of an action for malicious prosecution or abuse of
process."19 This reasoning has created an inequitable situation in
which physicians may be subjected to a baseless malpractice suit with-
out adequate judicial relief for their injuries.
Physicians have relied predominantly on malicious prosecution as
a theory of recovery for their countersuits. 20 However, many actions
initiated by physicians have been premised on abuse of process,21 negli-
gence, 22 defamation, 23 barratry24 and prima facie tort.25 A few physi-
17. The malpractice action against the two doctors was filed and was later dismissed when
their motions for summary judgment were sustained by the court. Id.
18. Id. at 336-37, 375 N.E.2d at 486.
19. Id. at 331, 375 N.E.2d at 482 (quoting Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 822, 372 N.E.
2d 685, 690 (1978)).
20. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595,
545 P.2d 411 (1976); Babb v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr.
179 (1971); Weaver v. Superior Ct., 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); Ammerman v.
Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978); Davis v. Ruff, 83 II1. App. 3d 651, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980);
Stopka v. Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d
824, 382 N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Brody
v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Raine
v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert
denied, 340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977); Gasis v. Schwartz, 80 Mich. App. 600, 264 N.W. 2d 76 (1978);
Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560, 418 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979); Drago v.
Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62
A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); O'Toole v.
Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. App.
1980); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
21. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Weaver v. Super. Ct. of Orange
Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); Stopka v. Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402
N.E.2d 781 (1980); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 975 (1979); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d 824, 382 N.E.2d
1257 (1978); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267
N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Spencer v. Burglass,
337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert denied, 340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977); Gasis v. Schwartz, 80
Mich. App. 600, 264 N.W.2d 76 (1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413
N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Martin v. Trevino,
578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
22. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Raine v.
Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980); Hoppenstein v.
Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn.
App. 1980); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W. 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d
567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
23. Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978).
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cians have also relied upon the theory that the attorney breached the
Code of Professional Responsibility26 or that a new cause of action for
willful and wanton filing of a lawsuit is mandated by state constitutions
which provide that for every wrong there is a remedy.
27
Although the number of physician countersuits has steadily in-
creased, only three of these suits have been successful. 28 To understand
the hindrance a physician encounters in a malpractice countersuit, this
note will explore the difficulty in proving the elements under each the-
ory of liability and the policy considerations which seem to disfavor
these actions. Primary focus will be placed on malicious prosecution
since it is the most frequently employed theory in physician counter-
suits. 29 This note then will examine the development of malicious
prosecution within Illinois and the inequities which result from the use
of an artificial standard which requires some form of special injury be-
yond that normally incurred in a suit. Finally, this article will advocate
the need for the reconsideration of the special injury requirement
within Illinois and discuss various alternatives the court could utilize in
its determination of this issue.
Although this note will focus primarily on the malicious prosecu-
tion of malpractice suits against physicians, it is equally applicable to
other unfounded professional malpractice suits. Just as physician mal-
practice suits have consistently increased in number, so too have mal-
practice actions against attorneys.30 The need to limit these suits to
24. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828,
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 975 (1979); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978);
Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
25. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560, 418 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979); Drago v.
Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62
A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
26. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d
940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 975 (1979); Lyddon
v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978).
27. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828,
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 975 (1979); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978);
Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978). The physicians in Berlin and Lyddon
alleged that the defendants had a duty to refrain from willfully and wantonly bringing suit with-
out probable cause. However, the courts treated this allegation as one for malicious prosecution.
28. Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980);
Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. App. 1980).
29. Twenty-two of the twenty-seven cases examined for this note plead a theory of malicious
prosecution. See supra note 20. The courts in two of the five suits which did not plead malicious
prosecution still utilized this theory in their determination of the plaintiffs' allegations. See supra
note 27. The three suits which did not raise the issue of malicious prosecution were Umansky v.
Urguhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978); Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957 (Nev.
1980); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
30. Representatives of the insurance industry and independent observers have indicated that
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only those actions which are justified is just as great with attorneys and
other professionals as it is with physicians. The issues and recommen-
dations discussed in this note are equally significant to all professionals
who are subject to malpractice actions.
I. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Malicious prosecution is a tort action for the institution, mali-
ciously and without probable cause, of an unfounded civil3' or criminal
proceeding. 32 The origins of an action of this theory are based on the
early common law of an action on the case. 33 Case was an action
which punished the "manifest vexation" which results from the wrong-
ful initiation of the legal process rather than an action for the initiation
of the suit. 34 Case was developed as a remedy for the consequential
damages incident to a suit. These damages were not compensated by
the internal sanctions of the cost statutes which were limited to the di-
rect expense of the litigation.35
In 1267, the common law was modified by the Statute of
Marleberge. 36 This statute eliminated an independent civil action for
malicious prosecution and gave a summary remedy for costs and dam-
ages to a defendant who prevailed in a maliciously prosecuted action.
As a result of this statute, a defendant who was maliciously prosecuted
was seen as having a full remedy and thus had no need to seek redress
in an independent action. Since the Statute of Marleberge was a substi-
tute remedy for the action of malicious prosecution, English courts
have refused to extend the tort to a civil action unless there has been an
arrest to the person or seizure of property which constitutes special
the attorney professional liability claims frequency quadrupled between 1973 and 1976, from
about 1.8 claims to about 7.2 claims per 100 insurance policies; that in 1977 claims would be filed
against an estimated 8 out of every 100 practicing attorneys; and that the latest figures available in
August 1979 indicated a ratio of 10 claims per 100 policies in 1979. Pfennigstorf, Types and Causes
of Lawyers' Professional Liability Claims: The Searchfor Facts, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 255, 258.
31. Originally malicious prosecution was utilized to recover damages for the institution of an
unjust criminal proceeding. However, this was later expanded to civil actions. Comment, supra
note 1, at 98.
32. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 119, at 834-35 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROSSER].
33. Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis,
88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Groundless Litigation].
34. See Savile v. Roberts, 1. Ld. Raym. 374, 380, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1151 (1698). In Savile,
Lord Holt, in dicta, established the guidelines that have become the modern English Rule.
35. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856-59 (1929). The costs statutes provided some
measure of compensation to wronged defendants, but these were limited to direct expenses of the
litigation. Taxable costs did not extend to damages arising from arrest of person or attachment of
property.
36. 52 Hen. 3, c. 6, § 2 (1267).
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injury.3 7
This requirement of some special injury beyond that which is ordi-
narily incurred in a civil action has created a split in the American
courts. A minority of jurisdictions38 have maintained the English re-
quirement of special injury39 as one of the elements of malicious prose-
cution. However, the majority of jurisdictions40 recognize that the
early common law did not require special injury and, while appreciat-
ing the historical developments of the special injury rule in England,
choose not to follow it. As a result, the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States have eliminated the special injury requirement.
By eliminating the special injury requirement, the courts in the
majority of jurisdictions have acknowledged the significant differences
between the traditional American concept of costs4' and those available
to a successful litigant in England. The majority of jurisdictions have
determined that the costs in the United States are totally inadequate
compensation for the time, effort and expense of defending a baseless
suit.
Although the majority of jurisdictions have eliminated the special
injury requirement, malicious prosecution is an action not favored in
37. Special injury has been defined as arrest of the person, interference with defendant's
property or some extraordinary injury which is ordinarily not an incident of defending similar
actions. However, the usual expenses of litigation, annoyance and inconvenience are insufficient
to form the basis of a claim of special injury. The loss of reputation, income, increased malprac-
tice insurance rates and mental suffering caused by the suit are not considered adequate to consti-
tute special damages in the minority jurisdictions. Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 I1n. App. 3d 824, 382
N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Pantone v. Demos, 59 I11. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Alswang v.
Claybon, 40 111. App. 3d 147, 351 N.E.2d 285 (1976); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978). The types of interferences recognized by special injury jurisdictions are proceedings
in lunacy, contempt, bastardy, juvenile delinquency, arrest under civil process, institution of bank-
ruptcy, attachment, garnishment, replevin, search of premises under a warrant, injunctions and
proceedings for dissolution of partnership. PROSSER, supra note 32, § 120, at 851-52.
38. Seventeen jurisdictions follow the minority English Rule: District Of Columbia, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin. See O'Toole v.
Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 518, 569 P.2d 561, 564 (1977), for a listing of cases for each state.
39. However, a few jurisdictions have broadened the English special injury rule to include
the loss of the right to practice a profession or business losses resulting from a suit. Rivers v. Dixie
Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga. App. 131, 76 S.E.2d 229 (1953); Carver v.Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 137
S.E.2d 139 (1964).
40. Twenty-three states follow the majority rule: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont and West Virginia. See O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 518, 569 P.2d 561,
564 (1977).
41. PROSSER, supra note 32 § 120, at 851. In America, the elimination of attorneys' fees as an
element of costs renders the English remedy of little value to the successful defendant who must
rely on malicious prosecution to recover his losses from the unjustified suit.
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the law.42 These courts reason that the heavy burden of proof a plain-
tiff must sustain in order to establish the elements of malicious prosecu-
tion will deter the problem of interminable litigation. Therefore, the
courts strictly construe the elements of malicious prosecution.
This strict construction approach has made it difficult for a plain-
tiff to establish the elements of malicious prosecution. The plaintiff in a
malicious prosecution action in both the minority and majority juris-
dictions must prove the elements of: (1) lack of probable cause for the
prior suit; (2) malice in instituting the original suit; and (3) termination
of the prior suit in favor of the original defendant. However, the ma-
jority and minority jurisdictions conflict on the requirement of special
injury; unlike the minority jurisdiction, the courts in the majority juris-
diction do not require this element.
43
A. Elements
1. Lack of Probable Cause
The absence of probable cause is an essential element of an action
for malicious prosecution. Any showing of probable cause is an abso-
lute defense barring recovery even if malice is proven.44 Probable
cause for instituting a proceeding within a civil context exists when
"there is a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circum-
stances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious, or pru-
dent, man 45 in the belief that the party committed the act of which he is
complaining." A successful malicious prosecution is dependent on
the plaintiff sustaining the burden of proving beyond a preponderance
of the evidence47 that the original claimant instituted an action without
a reasonable belief in the viability of his claim. This issue is determined
with regard to both the objective reasonableness of the claimant and
42. 52 AM. JUR. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 5 (1970).
43. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for the differences in the damage require-
ment between the majority and minority jurisdictions.
44. Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978).
45. The courts have utilized both the words "cautious" and "reasonable" in determining the
requirements of probable cause. The use of cautious seems to imply a more rigid standard of
inquiry, but this may simply be a careless use of terminology. See Note, Liabilityfor Proceeding
with Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAN. L. REV. 743, 747 (1980); Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d
637 (D.C. 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980) (cautious man). Carrol v.
Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976); Weaver v. Super. Ct. of Orange Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d
166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979) (reasonable man).
46. Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 277, 607 P.2d 438, 443-44 (1980); accord PROSSER, supra
note 22, § 119, at 841.
47. Hunter v. Beckley Newspaper Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 310, 40 S.E.2d 332, 337 (1946).
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his actual subjective belief in his claim.48 If the facts are disputed, the
determination of probable cause is left to the jury. Otherwise, it is a
question of law to be resolved by the court.
49
The attorney representing the patient in the malpractice action is
also liable for the malicious prosecution of a baseless suit. Therefore, it
is necessary to examine the belief of both the patient and the attorney
to assess the basis for the lack of probable cause in instituting the ac-
tion. The plaintiff who instigates the original suit can show probable
cause by proving the action was instituted on the advice of competent
counsel after full and truthful disclosure of the facts.50 Patients' good
faith reliance upon the advice of counsel immunizes them against lia-
bility for an attorney's derelictions or mistaken advice.51 The client,
nevertheless, will fail to meet the test of probable cause by acting in
bad faith; either through the failure to reveal all relevant facts, the im-
proper disclosure of false information, 52 or the initiation of a claim
which in good faith is known to be unjustified.53 However, a voluntary
dismissal by the plaintiff also can raise a presumption of want of prob-
able cause.
54
In contrast, an attorney has the duty55 to zealously pursue a cli-
ent's interests, although unsure of whether the client or the client's ad-
versary is truthful, as long as the issue is genuinely in doubt.56 Thus,
an attorney may rely in good faith upon the facts that the client relates
to him.57 However, if an attorney prosecutes a claim which "a reason-
able lawyer would not regard as tenable or by unreasonably neglecting
to investigate the facts and law in making his determination to pro-
48. Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291,
297 (1975).
49. See Carrol v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 598-99, 545 P.2d 411, 412 (1976); Nelson v. Miller, 227
Kan. 271, 277-78, 607 P.2d 438, 444 (1980).
50. Sazdoffv. Bourgeois, 301 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Williams v. Frey, 78 P.2d 1052
(Okla. 1938).
5 i. See Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice
Claims, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV., 653, 666-67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Effective Attack].
52. Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975).
53. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1975).
54. Eg., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Wetmore v.
Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 14 N.W. 722 (1883); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897);
Brown v. Liquidators, 152 Or. 215, 52 P.2d 187 (1935).
55. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(I) and EC 7-1 (1981).
56. Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683-84, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 297 (1975).
57. Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). An attorney may assume
the accuracy of facts related by his client unless lack of probable cause is obvious. Id.
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ceed,"' 8 then the lack of probable cause may be established. If the
question of probable cause is unclear, the court will most likely defer to
the attorney's judgment. 9 As a result, a plaintiff in a malicious prose-
cution action will encounter great difficulty in proving absence of prob-
able cause. The client will be sheltered by the absolute defense of good
faith reliance on the counsel's advice, and the attorney will be immune
because of the duty to be the client's advocate, a good faith reliance on
the client's assertions of the facts, or the existence of a debatable legal
issue which has been submitted for litigation.
60
2. Malice
Malice and absence of probable cause clearly are separate and ab-
solute requirements which must be proven before an action for mali-
cious prosecution can be sustained. Generally, however, courts have
determined that malice may be inferred by showing a lack of probable
cause.6
1
A jurisdiction's attitude toward malicious prosecution is frequently
evinced by the standard of malice it utilizes in such actions.62 Some
jurisdictions require actual malice which is generally evidenced by a
claimant's ill will, anger or desire to vex,6 3 although it is not necessary
to prove actual malice in the sense of hatred.64 Actual malice can be
shown when the original action was instituted with an improper mo-
tive.65 An improper motive would be any purpose other than the adju-
58. Tool Research & Eng'r. Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 683-84, 120 Cal. Rptr.
291, 297 (1975).
59. Comment, Attorneys' Liability To Clients' Adversaries For Instituting Frivolous Lawsuits.-
A Reassertion Of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 775, 777-78 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Attor-
neys Liability].
60. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1025; Malicious Prosecution, supra note 3.
61. Weaver v. Super. Ct. of Orange Co. 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 188, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 757
(1979); See also Comment, Attorney Liabilityfor Malicious Prosecution and Legal Malpractice: Do
They Overlap?, 8 PAC. L.J. 897, 904 (1977) ("Regardless of the theory on which a court relies to
find malice, a close factual analysis of the cases suggests that malice is almost always found from
the same facts as those which establish lack of probable cause.") The converse inference, i.e.,
finding a lack of probable cause from facts establishing a motive of ill will, is not permitted gener-
ally. See PROSSER, supra note 32, at § 119, at 841.
62. Comment, supra note 1, at 104.
63. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1025.
64. An attorney need not be personally motivated by malice. It is sufficient if he proceeded
with a suit knowing of his client's malicious motive. Munson v. Linnick, 255 Cal. App. 2d 589, 63
Cal. Rptr. 340 (1967); Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535 (1852), Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224, Minn. 224,
28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
65. Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607
P.2d 438 (1980); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 NW. 558 (1897). When a proceeding is intention-
ally instituted with any other motive than to bring a party to justice, it is in law a malicious
prosecution. Thus a suit is initiated for an improper purpose when the party bringing the suit
knows his claim is not meritorious.
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dication of the merits, such as filing for settlement value, delay or
resolution of an outstanding debt.
Legal or implied malice has also been deemed sufficient to sustain
a malicious prosecution action. Legal malice is evidenced by "the in-
tentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse."'66 A
wanton or reckless refusal to reasonably investigate, or the refusal to
terminate an action upon notice that it is groundless would according
to some courts, constitute evidence of legal malice.
67
3. Favorable Termination
The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution must be able to demon-
strate that the proceeding on which the suit is based has terminated 68 in
his favor.69 There are four principal reasons the courts have espoused
for this requirement. First, the termination of a civil proceeding with-
out a judicial determination of the factual issues is not evidence of lack
of probable cause since there is no preliminary determination regard-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the suit. 70 Therefore, dis-
missal on a technical procedural ground, or as a result of settlement or
consent,7' a cross-claim or counter-claim, 72 or the mere institution of a
66. Lyons v. St. Joseph Belt Ry. Co., 232 Mo. App. 575, 584, 84 S.W.2d 933, 944 (1935).
67. Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (D.C. Ohio 1973). Contra, Spencer
v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1976) cert. denied 340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977). The court in
Spencer stated that "malice exists where the charge is made with knowledge that it is false or with
reckless disregard as to whether it is false or not." Id. at 599. The court rejected the argument
that failure to investigate could entail reckless disregard of the truth. The court concluded that
"[alt worst, the allegation is that defendant went to trial with a poor case and got his just desserts,
to wit, he lost." Id. at 600.
68. Weaver v. Super. Ct. of Orange Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 184, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 755
(1979) (quoting, Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (1941)) (emphasis in
original).
The theory underlying the requirement of favorable termination is that it tends to indicate
the innocence of the accused, and coupled with the other elements of lack ofprobable cause
and malice, establishes the tort, that is, the malicious and unfounded charge of crime
aainst an innocent person. . . . The same fundamental theory is applied in testing a
dismissal or other termination without a complete trial on the merits. Ifit is of such a
nature as to indicate the innocence ofthe accused, it is afavorable termination suffcient to
satisfy the requirement. If however, the dismissal is on technical grounds, for procedural
reasons, or any other reason not inconsistent with his guilt, it does not constitute afavorable
termination.
69. Babb v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 845, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr.
179, 181 (1971); Gasis v. Schwartz, 80 Mich. App. 600, 602, 264 N.W.2d 76, 77 (1978); Hoppen-
stein v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46
N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
70. Savage v. Seed, 81 11. App. 3d 744, 401 N.E.2d 984 (1980).
71. Weaver v. Super. Co. of Orange Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 184, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 755
(1979) (voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a malpractice action is notper se unfavorable termi-
nation). See supra note 68.
72. Babb v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 841, 846, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 179, 181 (1971) (dicta).
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civil action by summons and complaint 73 does not constitute favorable
termination since such actions do not lend "credence to the claim that
the assertions (in the original complaint) were baseless."' 74 Although
judicial opinion is not uniform in its characterization of what consti-
tutes termination "in favor" of the original defendant, it is not essential
that the previous action conclude on the merits.75 Either a termination
not adverse to, or a decision favorable to the defendant (as distin-
guished from judgment on the merits) is sufficient evidence of
favorable termination. Thus, dismissal for failure to prosecute or aban-
donment would constitute favorable termination.
A second reason for requiring favorable termination prior to a ma-
licious prosecution action, is to prevent the possibility of inconsistent
judgments that would result if the plaintiff prevailed in the original
action but lost in the malicious prosecution suit.76 Courts have at-
tempted to eliminate conflicting verdicts where a plaintiff in a mali-
cious prosecution action could recover for the defendant's initiation of
the original suit which later is found to be justified.
77
Third, since the courts do not favor the action of malicious prose-
cution, the rule of favorable termination supports the public policy
considerations which the courts have examined. Favorable termination
discourages malicious prosecution actions,78 prevents unnecessary liti-
gation,79 and prevents any possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff in the
original suit.
80
Finally, without the termination requirement, concurrent actions
"would tend to drive a wedge between the malpractice plaintiff and his
73. Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (1978).
74. Savage v. Seed, 81 Ill. App. 3d 744, 748, 401 N.E.2d 984, 988 (1980) (quoting, Siegel v.
City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 2d 84, 108, 261 N.E.2d 802, 814 (1970)).
75. See, e.g., Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal. App. 3d 823, 145 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1978).
76. Babb v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846-47, 479 P.2d 379, 382, 92 Cal. Rptr.
179, 182 (1971). See also Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Ky. 1981); Gasis v. Schwartz, 80
Mich. App. 600, 602, 264 N.W.2d 76, 77 (1978).
77. The court in Savage v. Seed, 81 111. App. 3d 744, 401 N.E.2d 984 (1980), considered this
possibility when it rejected the plaintiffs argument that a voluntary dismissal would constitute
favorable termination.
78. Abolition of the favorable termination rule would encourage malicious prosecution since
defendants would utilize counterclaims more readily than instituting a separate action. Counter-
claims are seen as expanding the cause of action since they are less time consuming and less
expensive. Babb v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 849-50, 479 P.2d 379, 383-84, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 179, 183-84 (1971). See Effective Attack, supra, note 51.
79. Babb v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971).
A defendant who loses in a malpractice action will not institute a malicious prosecution suit since
the adverse judgment conclusively establishes that the plaintiff had probable cause.
80. Without the termination rule, a plaintiff would be prejudiced by the introduction of lack
of probable cause or malice in the original proceeding. Id. at 847-48, 479 P.2d at 382, 92 Cal.
Rptr. at 182.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
attorney."' 8' The attorney would be unable to adequately prepare his
client's case since he would be consumed in preparation of his own
defense and possibly could be forced to withdraw from the malpractice
action.8 2 Thus, the favorable termination requirement eliminates any
conflict of issues between the attorney and his client which would result
if they were placed in adverse positions as cross-defendants.
4. Conflicting Views Regarding Damages
Public policy considerations have been the determinative factor in
the courts' decisions regarding the requirement of special injury. The
minority jurisdictions require special damages because of the need for
"free and unfettered access to the courts."'83 These jurisdictions fear
that the threat of a countersuit will deter the honest claimants from a
vindication of their rights. They are also concerned that a litigant's
access to the courts will be extremely limited since attorneys, "fearful of
being held liable as insurers of the merits of their client's case,"'84 will
refuse to undertake representation in close or difficult matters.85
Another policy consideration commonly cited for the special in-
jury rule has been the belief that countersuits will result in an endless
stream of litigation.86 The courts have determined that the special in-
jury requirement facilitates judicial economy and places a restraint on
interminable litigation. "Otherwise litigation could lead, not to an end
of disputing, but to its beginning. '87
A third reason the minority jurisdictions espouse for retaining the
81. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Il. App. 3d 815, 820, 372 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1978). E.g., Babb v.
Super. Ct. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971).
82. Id.
83. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I11. App. 3d 940, 946, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1375 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828, reh'g denied 444 U.S. 974 (1979). See also Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C.
1978); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Il. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App.
3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Drago v. Buonagurio,
46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
84. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 111. App. 3d 815, 822, 372 N.E.2d 685, 690 (1978). See also Norton v.
Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I11. App. 3d 940, 381
N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Pantone v. De-
mos, 59 I11. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d
821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
85. The court in Norton v. Hines stated:
The attorney owes a duty to his client to present his case vigorously in a manner as
favorable to the client as the rules of law and professional ethics will permit. He is an
advocate and an officer of the court . . .The attorney must have the same freedom in
initiating his client's suit as the client. If he does not, lawsuits now justifiably com-
menced will be refused by attorneys, and the client, in most cases, will be denied his day
in court.
49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922-23, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240-41 (1975).
86. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978).
87. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (1942).
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special damages rule is that the award of costs is a sufficient remedy for
a defendant who successfully defends a groundless suit.88 Therefore,
these courts have decided that a defendant in a frivolous lawsuit is not
justified in seeking additional relief unless he has sustained some ex-
traordinary injury.
The final justification which the state appellate courts have given
for the special injury requirement is that the responsibility for altering
the old common law rule is for the legislature and not the courts.8 9
Although the courts were responsible for the original rule and in many
ways are institutionally better equipped for the rational and systematic
development of private law,90 the minority jurisdictions have deemed
that the legislative process is the appropriate means for any modifica-
tion of the special injury rule. The minority jurisdictions cite two rea-
sons for this conclusion. First, they contend that the legislature can
utilize certain techniques, such as specifying minimum or maximum
amounts of recovery, which are not available to the courts. Second,
these jurisdictions argue that an appeal briefed by two parties does not
equal the public participation present in legislative hearings.
The courts which have rejected the special injury requirement
have found no merit in the policy considerations advocated by the mi-
nority jurisdictions. The Restatement of Torts has also rejected the mi-
nority jurisdictions' policy arguments and the special injury
requirement. 91 While concurring that the courts should be open for the
vindication of justifiable claims, the proponents of the Restatement
Rule advocate the need for deterring meritless suits92 and compensat-
ing those burdened with the defense of such actions.93 These courts
have concluded that the risk of indiscriminate, endless litigation is suf-
ficiently minimized by the difficulty a plaintiff incurs in proving the
basic elements of the tort. Therefore, the additional hindrance of spe-
88. Perry v. Arsham, 101 Ohio App. 285, 136 N.E.2d 141 (1956).
89. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513,
569 P.2d 561 (1977).
90. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L.
REV. 265 (1963). Legislatures are said to give attention to the development of malicious prosecu-
tion only sporadically at the initiative of special interests. Also, future claimants in civil litigation
rarely perceive a common interest in the law in advance of such litigation. Professor Peck con-
tended that the courts are best suited to make reforms in private law since they are more familiar
with the actual functions of legal rules in litigation.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674, Comment e (1977) (the wronged party must
show material harm or violation of a legal right that would itself support action for damages)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
92. See, e.g., Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975).
93. See, e.g., Whipple v. Fuller, II Conn. 582, 585 (1836); Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 215-
22 (1869).
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cial injury is unnecessary. 94
The advocates of the Restatement Rule also have challenged the
minority's concern for the "free and unfettered access" to the courts
since these very courts have barred any possibility of recovery for those
physicians damaged by a maliciously prosecuted malpractice suit.95
The majority of jurisdictions have also rejected the minority's position
that potential countersuits in malicious prosecution will deter honest
claimants from seeking judicial redress since there was a scarcity of
empirical evidence to support this fear.96 These courts have decreed
that the judicial process must be available to both plaintiffs and de-
fendants who are seeking vindication of their rights.
The courts in the majority jurisdictions have also rejected the the-
ory that the award of costs constituted adequate compensation for one
subjected to a groundless suit. Not only are court costs relatively trivial
in comparison with the total expense of defending a suit,97 but the gen-
eral statutes regulating costs make no distinction between an honest
suitor with a valid claim and the litigant who maliciously files a base-
less suit.98 Thus, with costs alone as a redress for the expense necessary
to a defense, both those who lawfully and maliciously sue would stand
on exactly the same footing in regard to their liability for their acts.99
The proponents of the Restatement Rule agree that the courts should
be available for those seeking redress for their injuries. However, these
advocates urge that this policy does not demand that malicious plain-
tiffs should be encouraged, by the assurance of protection in advance,
to "vex, damage, and even ruin a peaceful citizen by the illegal prose-
cution of an action upon an unfounded claim."' °
Once actual damages exceeding recoverable costs in the original
94. See, e.g., Note, Physicians Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defamation and Abuse of
ProcessAs Remedies For Meritless Medical Malpractice Suits, 45 U. CIN. L. REV., 604, 608 (1976).
95. See Comment, supra note 1, at 98. In jurisdictions that continue to apply the strict re-
quirement of proof of special injury, the physician's ability to assert a cause of action for malicious
prosecution is illusory, in most cases, because the patient's suit against a physician for malpractice
does not usually involve a civil arrest of the physician, seizure of the physicians' property, or any
recognized special injury to the physician which would not ordinarily result in all suits prosecuted
for like causes of action. Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1022-23.
96. See Effective Attack, supra note 51. There is no indication of any marked decline in the
jurisdictions which have adopted the liberal majority. For a study of malicious prosecution ac-
tions in a state adopting the liberal view, see Comment, Malicious Prosecutions in Tennessee, 29
TENN. L. REV. 552 (1962).
97. See McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Dam-
ages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 620-21 (1931). See also Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala.
348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Kolka v.Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
98. Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
99. Id.
100. Id., 71 N.W. at 560.
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action are shown, both the English and the Restatement Rule allow for
recovery of all expenses and damage incurred by reason of the wrong-
ful litigation.,01 These damages include any loss of income,102 reason-
able legal fees incurred in defending the malpractice suit, 10 3 harm to
reputation, 1°4 mental suffering °5 and any consequential damages.
10 6
Punitive damages may also be recovered where there is proof of actual
malice. 107
B. Successful Actionsfor Malicious Prosecution
Two physician countersuits for malicious prosecution have been
successful.' 08 In Raine v. Drasin,109 two physicians recovered for the
malicious prosecution of a medical malpractice suit which was filed by
an attorney, Raine. The malpractice suit charged that the physicians
negligently broke their patient's shoulder. The suit was commenced
and continued despite the attorney's knowledge that neither of the phy-
sicians had any contact with the patient until after the injury had al-
ready occurred.
The court determined that the allegation made in the malpractice
case regarding the physicians' "careless and negligent manner" was a
sufficient basis for the finding that the doctors' reputations had been
assailed."l 0 The court stated that the accusation of negligence in the
exercise of one's profession can certainly result in "mortification, hu-
miliation, injury to the reputation, character and health, mental suffer-
ing, and general impairment of social and mercantile standing-all of
which are elements of damage in a malicious prosecution action."'"1l
Since all of the elements of malicious prosecution were present,11 2 the
101. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, at § 681.
102. Ray Wong v. Earle C. Anthony Inc., 199 Cal. 15, 247 P. 894 (1926).
103. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1068 (1968).
104. Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895
(Ky. 1981). It has been argued that damage to reputation resulting from a malicious prosecution
action should be considered a special injury in those states that follow the minority rule. See
Note, Malicious Prosecution-Injury to Reputation as a Basis for Recovery, 6 WILLIAMETTE L.J.
173 (1970).
105. Stalker v. Drake, 91 Kan. 142, 136 P. 912 (1913); Cohn v. Saidel, 71 N.H. 558, 53 A. 800
(1902).
106. Babb v. Super. Co. of Sonoma Co., 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847-48 at n.4, 479 P.2d 379, 382-83 &
n.4, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182-83 & n.4 (1971).
107. Richards v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1978).
108. Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn.
App. 1980).
109. 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981).
110. Id. at 900.
lll. Id.
112. Favorable termination was proven since the dismissal with prejudice "did not entail any
compromise or settlement; it simply and effectively terminated the lawsuit. ... Id. at 899. Ab-
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court ruled that the defendant was responsible for all damages sus-
tained, in addition to loss of time, expense incurred and punitive
damages. "13
Peerman v. Sidicane"t4 was the second successful malicious prose-
cution action. In Peerman, a physician was awarded damages in an
action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The physician
was sued for malpractice by his patient who alleged that he had negli-
gently diagnosed and treated her condition. She also alleged that he
had delayed advising her of his misdiagnosis since the laboratory tests
he administered were delayed because the doctor used a lab where he
received a "kickback" of a portion of the fees." 15 However the court
found that after filing the suit, the attorney made substantially no in-
vestigation of the case" 16 and that there was actually ample evidence to
indicate that the physician conformed to the highest standard of the
medical profession in the treatment of his patient. 17 The court deter-
mined that the attorney was liable for malicious prosecution and abuse
of process because he had continued the suit without his client's knowl-
edge or consent, had made allegations in the complaint which were
pure speculation on his part and had prosecuted a groundless appeal
without the consent of his client." 8
II. ALTERNATE THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Since the problems in proving the elements of malicious prosecu-
tion and the requirement of special injury in the minority jurisdictions
have proven to be formidable obstacles to a physician seeking recovery
in a malicious prosecution suit, many doctors have sought alternate
sence of probable cause was shown through the expert testimony that the attorney did not comply
with the standard of care for ordinary and prudent lawyers. Id. at 901. The attorney's failure to
investigate the facts and law prior to filing the suit was also material as to the question of probable
cause. Id. at 902. Although the court did not specify the basis of its determination of malice, it
did state that malice could be inferred from lack of probable cause. Id. at 901. See supra notes
I10-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of damages.
113. Id. at 900.
114. 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. App. 1980).
115. Id. at 243.
116. Id. at 244-45. The attorney did not take the physician's or any other person's deposition.
He made no effort to prove or support the allegation of fee-splitting. He also did not consult any
physician regarding the standard of medical treatment in the community concerning the type of
treatment given.
117. Id. at 245. The physician had given the patient the most reliable medical laboratory test
with results available within 48 hours; any delay in the patient's learning of these results was due
to her own failure to consult the doctor two days after her first visit. There was also no factual
basis for the allegation of fee-splitting and expert testimony was given regarding the doctor's stan-
dard of care.
118. Id. at 245.
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theories of recovery. Physicians have relied on alternate theories such
as abuse of process, defamation, barratry, prima facie tort and, most
frequently, negligence." 9 However, these causes of action have not
proven any more successful than malicious prosecution. The courts
have rejected the alternate theories and have referred the physician to
the appropriate action of malicious prosecution. Of these alternatives,
abuse of process is the most successful, even though this success has
been extremely limited.
20
A4. Abuse of Process
Abuse of process has been defined as a misuse or perversion of
regularly issued legal process, after it has been issued, to achieve some
collateral purpose not justified by the nature of the process. ' 2' In order
to recover for this action, a plaintiff must plead and prove three ele-
ments: (1) that the defendant made an illegal, improper or perverted
use of the process-a use neither warranted nor authorized by the pro-
cess; (2) that the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in exer-
cising such illegal, perverted or improper use of the process; and
(3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff as a result of such irregular
acts. ' 2
2
Abuse of process and malicious prosecution are similar in that
they both originated from the action on the case, 123 resulted from an
improper use of the legal process, 24 allow for the same compensatory
damages 25 and require that special injury be proven. 26 However,
there are several major distinctions between the two actions. The fun-
damental difference between malicious prosecution and abuse of pro-
cess is that in the latter the original use of the legal process is justified,
but the process itself is later employed for a purpose not contemplated
119. See Comment, Physician Countersuit. A Cause Without Action, 12 PAC. L.J. 745 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Couniersuit].
120. Of the three successful physician countersuits, the plaintiffs in two of these suits prevailed
on the theory of abuse of process. Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980) (abuse of process
only); Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.w.2d 242 (Tenn. App. 1980) (both abuse of process and mali-
cious prosecution); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981) (recovery was granted for the
malicious prosecution but the abuse of process action was dismissed).
121. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 905 (Iowa 1978). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, at
§ 682; Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1033-34.
122. Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
123. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
124. See Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1034.
125. Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957, 960 (Nev. 1980).
126. Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978). The
similarity between malicious prosecution and abuse of process, with regard to the special injury
requirement, only applies to those jurisdictions which follow the English Rule.
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by the law. 127 The basis of malicious prosecution, however, is that the
process is initiated maliciously and without any justification.
Another distinction between the two actions is that abuse of pro-
cess does not require two of the elements of malicious prosecution: the
termination of the initial proceeding in the defendant's favor 28 or ab-
sence of probable cause in the original suit. 29 Although abuse of pro-
cess does require malice, it is not the ill will or absence of possible
success required in malicious prosecution suits. 130 Rather, it is the use
of the legal process for an ulterior purpose. This is evidence of a de-
fendant's willful, intentional misuse of the process proper to the pro-
ceeding.' 3 1 The essence of the tort lies in the use of otherwise legal
process to extort some collateral advantage from the defendant, fre-
quently to force a nuisance settlement.
Abuse of process has not been a widely successful alternative for a
physician maliciously prosecuted for malpractice. In all but two
cases, 132 the courts have rejected this theory in physician countersuits.
The courts have determined that an allegation of instituting a ground-
less suit is not sufficient to state a cause of action for abuse of process.
The courts have determined that when the judicial process is used in a
technically appropriate manner, such as initiating a suit, the process
has not been abused. Consequently, the filing of a medical malpractice
suit, even though meritless, is seen as a proper use of the legal process
since the purpose of such a suit is the settlement of the alleged damages
and this would be within the goals of proper process. 13 3 Thus, unless
physicians were able to allege that the malpractice action was misused
after it was instituted, the courts have rejected the abuse of process the-
ory and have recommended malicious prosecution as the proper cause
of action.
Peerman v. Sidicane 34 and Bull v. McCuskey 35 are two cases in
which a physician relying on abuse of process has successfully recov-
127. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d
895, 902 (Ky. 1981).
128. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
129. See PROSSER, supra note 32, § 121, at 856.
130. See Higgs, supra note 10, at 90.
131. Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P.2d 957, 961 (Nev. 1980).
132. Id See also Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.w.2d 242 (Tenn. App. 1980).
133. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
134. 605 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. App. 1980). The court did not discuss the malicious prosecution
and abuse of process actions separately. Therefore, for a discussion of Peerman and the court's
reasoning for awarding of damages in the abuse of process action, see supra notes 114-18 and
accompanying text.
135. 615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980).
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ered for the damages resulting from a malpractice suit. In Bull, the
physician alleged that the attorney instituted the malpractice action for
the ulterior purpose of coercing a nuisance settlement because he knew
there was no basis for the claim of malpractice. The attorney did not
examine the medical records prior to filing the malpractice suit, did not
confer with another doctor regarding the standard of care adminis-
tered, nor did he take the deposition of the physician sued. 136 The
court determined that the attorney's offer to settle the case for the mini-
mal amount of $750 when combined with his failure to adequately in-
vestigate prior to filing the malpractice suit, as well as the total absence
of the necessary expert evidence, supported a finding for abuse of
process. '
37
An abuse of process action, similar to Bull, was upheld in Peer-
man. A Tennessee appellate court based its decision on the attorney's
prosecution of a groundless appeal without the consent of his client, his
failure to reasonably investigate the malpractice action, and the filing




Another theory physicians have used to counterattack perceived
unfounded malpractice suits is the tort of defamation. Defamation is
the invasion of one's interest in reputation and good name. To consti-
tute a cause of action, a physician must prove: (1) that the defamatory
matter was communicated to a third person; (2) that it was understood
to be referring to the physician and as being defamatory to him; and
(3) that it resulted in damage to the physician. 139
A strong argument exists that a physician would have a cause of
action for defamation because an unfounded malpractice action
wrongfully attacks his or her professional reputation by alleging that he
or she lacked reasonable professional skill. However, to date, defama-
tion has not been a successful theory for a physician damaged by an
unfounded malpractice suit.
The absolute privilege which exists for judicial proceedings immu-
nizes the patients from liability for any communications 4 ° which are a
136. Id. at 959.
137. Id. at 960.
138. Peerman v. Sidicane, 605 S.W.2d at 245.
139. See generally, PROSSER, supra note 32, §§ 111-16.
140. Most American courts do not extend an absolute privilege to all statements made within
the judicial proceeding. Rather, they extend immunity only for statements made in good faith
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part of, and relevant to, a judicial proceeding.' 4 1 The purpose of this
privilege is to allow free access to the courts, for "to decide otherwise
would be to create an unnecessary chilling effect upon lawyers."'
' 42
C Barratry
Three physician countersuits have alleged barratry as a cause of
action. 143 Barratry is the offense of "frequently exciting and stirring up
quarrels and lawsuits."' 144 This action did not succeed in any of the
three cases.
The Illinois Appellate Court dismissed two of the barratry claims
by stating that the filing of a civil suit did not constitute common barra-
try because several acts of barratrous nature were required by the stat-
ute, 14 5 not merely a single act. 146  The other barratry claim, brought
under the Texas barratry statute, 147 was dismissed because it was re-
garded as a public remedy and not a private one since it provided for a
criminal sanction to supplement the tort remedy available for malicious
which are relevant to the issues in the case. Id. at § 118, at 831-32. See Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543
S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
141. PROSSER, supra note 32, at § 118, at 831-32. See, e.g., Umansky v. Urquhart, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 368, 371-72, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547, 549 (1978); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex Civ.
App. 1976).
142. Umansky v. Urquhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 372, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547, 549 (1978). Defama-
tion has offered physicians no real remedy for any slanderous statements made regarding their
incompetence during a malpractice suit. The only situation where a physician could sustain such
a claim is if the defamatory statement was made outside the judicial process to other persons.
Jankelson v. Cisel, 3 Wash. App. 139, 473 P.2d 202 (1970).
143. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I11. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828,
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978);
Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
144. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 137 (5th ed. 1979).
145. The Illinois statute provides:
Barratry-Violation § 26. If any person shall wickedly and willfully excite and stir up any
suits or quarrels between the people of this state with a view to promote strife and con-
tention, he shall be deemed guilty of the petty offense of common barratry; and if he be
an attorney or counselor at law, he shall be suspended from the practice of his profes-
sion, for any time not exceeding 6 months.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch 13, § 21 (1976).
146. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 956, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1378 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Il. App. 3d 822, 372 N.E.2d 685,
690 (1979). The court did not consider the filing of an allegedly baseless suit as constituting barra-
try. However, the contributors of countersuit funds to aid physicians in their malpractice suits
could be sued for "stirring up" and "exciting" lawsuits. Since the trend has been towards a more
rigorous application of the laws of barratry, champerty and maintenance, such a suit would proba-
bly be unsuccessful. See supra note 8; Note, Countersuit.- A Viable Alternativefor the Wrongfully
Sued Physician?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 450, 460-61 (1980).
147. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(a)(2)(Vernon 1974) provides that a person is guilty of
the offense of barratry if, "with intent to obtain a benefit for himself or to harm another he insti-
tutes any suit or claim that he knows is false." The court determined that this language provides a
criminal sanction to supplement the tort remedy available for malicious prosecution.
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prosecution. 148
D. Prima Facie Tort
A novel approach of prima facie tort has been utilized by several
physicians as an alternative to malicious prosecution.149 A prima facie
tort is the infliction of an intentional harm without excuse or justifica-
tion by an act or series of acts which otherwise would be lawful and
which results in special damages.150 The basic elements of prima facie
tort are: (1) an intent to injure on the part of the defendant; (2) a lack
of justification in so acting; and (3) special damages, alleged with
particularity. 15
Prima facie tort has not been a successful alternative to a physi-
cians' countersuit to a baseless malpractice suit. The courts have re-
jected a prima facie claim for various reasons. The most prevalant
reason given is that a prima facie tort should not be utilized to circum-
vent the requirements of establishing a traditional tort. 52 The courts
have once again stressed the need for open access to the courts and
have thus stated that "[pIrima facie tort should not become a 'catch-all'
alternative for every cause of action which cannot stand on its legs.' 53
Since prima facie tort is one which, by definition, does not fall within
the categories of the traditional torts,' 54 the courts have refused to ac-
cept such a claim when relief is available under malicious
prosecution. 
55
Another justification for the courts rejection of a prima facie tort is
the courts' belief that the cause of action should be mandated by the
148. Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567, 571 (1978).
149. Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821,413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppen-
stein v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392
N.E.2d 560, 418 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
150. Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978). Prima
facie tort appears to have first been enunciated in 1904 by Mr. Justice Holmes in Aikins v. Wis-
consin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904), in which he ruled that even lawful conduct can become unlawful
when done maliciously. Id. at 205-06.
151. Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). See also, Birnbaum, supra
note 4, at 1054; Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d 1191, 1215-20 (1967).
152. Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); see also Drago v.
Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
153. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 A.D.2d 319, 323, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1978), aff'd 47 N.Y.2d
820, 392 N.E.2d 560, 418 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979).
154. Id. at 322, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 64. See also Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 772 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978).
155. Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Belsky v.Lowenthal, 62
A.D.2d 319, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.S.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560, 418 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1979).
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legislature as a matter of public policy, and not by the courts. 156 The
requirement of proving special injury has also served as an insur-
mountable barrier to recovery under prima facie tort.
157
E. Constitutional Mandate of a Remedy
Several suits have utilized a different approach in an action in the
nature of prima facie tort.15 8 These suits have been premised on Arti-
cle I, Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution which guarantees a remedy
for every wrong. 59 The physicians in these suits claimed that a rejec-
tion of a prima facie tort suit deprived them of a constitutional right to
a redress for all injuries.160 The Illinois Appellate Courts have rejected
this argument, stating that the constitutional provision is "an expres-
sion of philosophy, and not a mandate that a 'certain remedy' be pro-
vided in any specific form.''
The Illinois courts have also decreed that as long as some redress
for the alleged wrong exists, Section 12 does not mandate a recognition
of any new remedy. 62 The courts have determined that the inability of
the plaintiffs to meet the onerous burden of proof under recognized
remedies or the limited relief provided by such remedies is irrele-
vant. 163 According to the courts, the failure to state a cause of action
cannot be cured by alleging a new remedy and dismissal of such an
action does not infringe on any constitutional rights. 164 As a result,
physicians suing under a constitutional theory were referred to the
proper remedies of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, recovery of
attorney fees' 65 and institution of disciplinary proceedings against the
156. Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 368 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Martin v.
Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
157. Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 A.D.2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978).
158. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828,
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978);
Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 11. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978).
159. "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he
recieves to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely,
completely, and promptly." ILL. CONsT. art I § 12.
160. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 950, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1374, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 332, 375 N.E.2d
480, 483 (1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 I11. App. 3d 815, 823, 372 N.E.2d 685, 690-91 (1978).
161. Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 332, 375 N.E.2d 480, 483 (1978).
162. Id.
163. Id. ; Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
164. Id. at 951, 381 N.E.2d at 1374. (1978).
165. Attorney fees can be recovered in Illinois under section 2-611 Ill. Code of Civil Proce-
dure, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-611 (1982). This act was established as an additional remedy
for unfounded malpractice suits in an effort to curb the malpractice crisis. See Attorney's Liability,




The remedies up to this point have discussed physician counter-
suits against the patient and his attorney. However, one alternative ac-
tion, negligence, is directed solely against the patient's attorney. The
attorney's alleged liability for negligence is based upon a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility 67 and a breach of duty to a
third party not to file a malpractice suit which the attorney knew or
should have known would be unsuccessful.
168
The courts, however, have rejected the theory that attorneys owe a
duty of care to adverse parties in litigation. 169 Although attorneys have
been held liable to third parties who were intended beneficiaries of the
attorneys' actions, 70 the courts have determined that the adversary
process precludes any possibility of reliance by opposing parties.' 7 '
Since an adverse party is clearly not an intended beneficiary of the ad-
verse counsel's client, 72 the attorney owes his primary and paramount
duty to his own client and not the adverse party.
73
Public policy considerations have also been provided as justifica-
tion for the courts' refusal to further extend the tort of negligence. The
courts fear that the imposition of third party negligence on an attorney
would "place an attorney in a position where his own interests would
conflict directly with his client's interests."' 74 This conflict of interest
166. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 111. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828,
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 823, 372 N.E.2d 685, 691
(1978).
167. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A)(1) and EC 7-10. See also,
infra note 178. DR 7-10(A)(l) provides:
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a position,
conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another.
EC 7-10 provides:
The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concur-
rent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to
avoid the infliction of needless harm.
168. See supra note 22.
169. Id. The negligence claims were rejected in all cases.
170, Norton v, Hines, 49 Cal. app. 3d 917, 923, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975); Brody v. Ruby,
267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978).
171. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
172. Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 921, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240 (1975).
173. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
174. Weaver v. Super. Ct. of Orange Co., 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 179, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745, 751
(1979).
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would simultaneously deny the client's right to effective counsel 75 and
his right to free access to the courts. 176 Since the attorney has a duty to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, 177 the courts
have consistently refused to impose a duty of care to an adverse third
party. The courts have determined that such an imposition would re-
sult in attorneys refusing lawsuits now justifiably commenced, and
thus, the client would be denied his day in court.
1 78
The courts also have rejected physicians' negligence claims against
attorneys based on a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity adopted by the American Bar Association. Physicians have argued
that the Code prohibits an attorney from asserting claims which he or
she knows to be groundless, or when it is obvious that such actions
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. However,
the courts have determined that the Code does not set professional
standards of civil liability 79 or establish a private remedy for such vio-
lations. 80 Since the Code merely delineates minimum levels of compe-
tency and not a private cause of action,' 8 ' the courts have determined
that a violation of the Code was not tantamount to a tortious act, par-
ticularly with regard to liability to a nonclient.
82
Courts have also affirmed the basic adversary nature of the legal
profession and an attorney's duty to zealously advocate a client's inter-
ests.' 83 In Brody v. Ruby, the court denied recovery under a claim of a
violation of the Code, for to do so, "would be to destroy [the attorney's]
175. Id. at 179, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 750-51.
176. Id See also, Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975); Pantone v.
Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386
N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
177. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123
Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
178. Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 923, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 241 (1975).
179. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d
940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Lyddon
v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978);
Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So.2d 596 (La. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So.2d 990 (La. 1977); O'Toole v. Franklin, 270 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561
(1977); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.w.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). See also, supra note 165. Sev-
eral cases also alleged violations of the state codes. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381
N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Lyddon v. Shaw,
56 I11. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); O'Toole
v. Franklin 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978).
180. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Iowa 1978).
181. Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
182. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
183. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Iowa 1978).
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efficacy as advocate of his client and his value to the court. .... ,,184
The courts decreed that the sole remedial method for a violation of the
Code is the imposition of disciplinary measures 185 and recommended
that the physicians seek such redress through the appropriate
proceedings. 
86
III. SUMMARY OF PHYSICIAN COUNTERSUITS
Malicious prosecution, with a few exceptions, 18 7 is the sole cause
of action available to the victims of baseless suits.18 8 The courts have
rejected every other remedy utilized by physicians in a countersuit for
unjustified malpractice suit, except abuse of process. 18 9 The courts
have continued to articulate the fear that such countersuits will have a
"chilling effect" on both the plaintiff's ability to seek vindication for
any injuries sustained and the attorney's willingness to accept cases.
Thus, with free access to the courts as a prime consideration, the courts
have restricted the victims of unjustified suits to a remedy of malicious
prosecution which offers little hope of complete relief.
IV. HISTORY OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IN ILLINOIS
A. SMITH V. MICHIGAN BUGGY CO.
Illinois follows the minority jurisdiction requirement of proof of
special injury to sustain a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
This action was first considered by the Illinois Supreme Court in Smith
v. Michigan Buggy Co .190 Smith, the plaintiff in the malicious prosecu-
tion action, was sued in the original action for fraudulent misrepresen-
tation. His employer alleged that, due to Smith's misrepresentation
regarding his past sales record and his ability to procure future sales, he
had entered into an employment contract with Smith and had suffered
184. Berlin v.Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 953, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
185. See Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.w.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). The disciplinary
measures taken are discretionary and an attorney may be disbarred, suspended or censured de-
pending on the character of the offense. See also Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1074-77.
186. Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.w.2d 902, 908 (Iowa 1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815,
823, 372 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). A
grievance can be filed under procedures enumerated in the State Bar Rules for the redress of an
alleged professional misconduct.
187. Under certain circumstances abuse of process has been a feasible physician countersuit.
See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
189. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
190. 175 I11. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898).
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financial losses. 19 1 After the fraudulent misrepresentation suit was re-
solved in Smith's favor, he sued his employer alleging that the suit was
a malicious prosecution without probable cause.
The court determined that Smith had established all the elements
of malicious prosecution except special injury. 92 In adopting special
injury as an essential element of the action, the court concluded that it
was its "duty to be governed by the weight of authority," rather than by
the able and ingenious reasoning of the advocates opposing the English
Rule which also required the element of special injury.
193
In accepting the special injury requirement, the Smith court bal-
anced the injuries which a victim of an unfounded suit must bear with-
out any remedy, against the need to keep the courts open to every
citizen, and found the latter to be more imperative. 194 It has been
stressed that the courts must be open to litigants for settlement of their
rights without fear of prosecution for calling upon the courts to deter-
mine such rights. 9
5
The Illinois Supreme Court also justified the special injury man-
date on the basis of deterring interminable litigation. The court feared
that "the conclusion of one suit would be but the beginning of an-
other." 196 It foresaw a future where every unsuccessful litigation would
be followed by another alleging malice in the prosecution of the former
action. According to the court, special injury would insure against
these dangers.
B. Special Injury
Special injury, as defined by the Illinois courts, is the arrest of a
person or seizure of his property, or injury not necessarily resulting in
all suits, such as the loss of the right to practice a profession or business
losses resulting from the suit. 19 7 Special injury has been proven in Illi-
nois in several situations. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that
the defendant's property rights were sufficiently restricted to constitute
special injury where a petition for involuntary bankruptcy was wrong-
fully filed. During the adjudication of the bankruptcy, all the property
of the debtor became subject to the control of the court and the debtor's
191. Id. at 621, 51 N.E. at 570.
192. Id. at 624, 51 N.E. at 571.
193. Id. at 626, 51 N.E. at 571.
194. Id. at 628, 51 N.E. at 571.
195. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 I11. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937).
196. Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 175 IU. 619, 629, 51 N.E. 569, 572 (1898).
197. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 IH. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937).
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right to free use of his own property was suspended. 98 The requisite
damage was also shown when a suit was repeatedly filed simply to har-
ass the defendant. 199 Special injury was also sustained in situations
where a civil suit charged a person with being of unsound mind and the
person was arrested, 200 and where a physician falsely certified a patient
for emergency admission to a mental hospital. 20' The defendant of a
creditor suit also sustained the requisite special injury when she was
forced to forfeit her home after she was unable to make the mortgage
payments because a temporary injuction prevented her from using the
proceeds of her husband's life insurance policy.
20 2
In each of the above situations where special injury was proven,
the plaintiff was able to show actual interference with the person or
seizure of property. However, unless a physician loses his license, it is
almost impossible for a physician in a malpractice suit to sustain an
injury within these narrowly defined limits. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that the physician does not suffer damage as a result of a mali-
ciously prosecuted suit.
The injuries physicians may sustain when forced to defend an un-
founded suit include damage to professional reputation,20 3 mental
anguish, 2°4 loss of time and income from their professional practice,
205
payment of increased malpractice insurance premiums206 and an alter-
ation in the manner in which they practice medicine. 20 7 Despite these
injuries, the courts have held that each of these damage elements are
incident to all malpractice litigation. Therefore, these damages fall
within the "ordinary injury" Illinois courts expect defendants to suffer
198. Norin v. Scheldt Mfg. Co., 297 Ill. 521, 130 N.E. 791 (1920).
199. Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134 N.E. 705 (1922).
200. Brandt v. Brandt, 297 Il. App. 306, 17 N.E.2d 535 (1938).
201. Olsen v. Karwaski, 68 Il1. App. 3d 1031, 386 N.E.2d 444 (1979).
202. Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 78 I11. 2d 235, 399 N.E.2d 1286 (1980).
203. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979);
Stopka v. Lesser, 82 IlU. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Davis v. Ruff, 83 11. App. 3d 651, 404
N.E.2d 405 (1980).
204. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 I1n. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979);
Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d 824, 382 N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Stopka v. Lesser, 82 I11. App.
3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Davis v. Ruff, 83 Ill. App. 3d 651, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980).
205. Id.
206. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 I11. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I11.
App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979);
Pantone v. Demos, 59 I11. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Il. App.
3d 824, 382 N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Stopka v. Lesser, 82 II. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980);
Davis v. Ruff, 83 I11. App. 3d 651, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980).
207. Davis v. Ruff, 83 Ill. App. 3d 651, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980).
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as a result of such suits, whatever the merits.208
By requiring special injury as an essential element of a malicious
prosecution action, the Illinois courts have dismissed a suit in which the
physician was sued for malpractice without ever having treated the pa-
tient.209 The physician, who was an inactive hospital staff member and
had no connection with the patient's treatment, was added as a defend-
ant five months after the complaint was filed. The hospital records
which were available during discovery clearly indicated that the physi-
cian did not have any contact with the patient, and thus, the attorney
should have known that probable cause to sue the physician was ab-
sent. A physician was also sued for malpractice in failing to control the
decedent's bleeding when the sole care he had rendered was the taking
of a chest X-ray.210 The courts have also ignored situations where an
attorney has continued to prosecute a malpractice action without ever
examining the relevant medical records211 or obtaining an opinion of a
qualified expert as to a deviation from a proper standard of care.212
Each of these factual circumstances indicate that Illinois physicians
may be subject to meritless and malicious prosecutions without ade-
quate remedy for their injuries.
C BERLIN V NATHAN
Illinois had a brief period where recovery was allowed for an un-
justly accused malpractice defendant when an Illinois trial court sus-
tained a physician's malicious prosecution action in Berlin v. Nathan .213
The physician in Berlin was sued for malpractice alleging that he had
negligently taken X-rays and improperly diagnosed a finger injury. Dr.
Berlin filed a cross-complaint prior to the termination of the original
malpractice action. In the complaint, he alleged that his patient, her
husband and their attorneys had breached a duty owed to him to re-
frain from willfully and wantonly bringing suit against him without
having reason to believe that he had been guilty of malpractice.21 4 Dr.
Berlin contended that section 12 of the Illinois Constitution, which pro-
vides that every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws, man-
208. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 11. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828,
rehk'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
209. Stopka v. Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980).
210. Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ii. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978).
211. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978).
212. Id.; Davis v. Ruff, 83 II. App. 3d 651, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980).
213. 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444
U.S. 974 (1979).
214. Id. at 943, 381 N.E.2d at 1369.
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dated a new remedy for willful and wanton filing of an unjustified
lawsuit.
On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
decision in Berlin. The appellate court rejected the claim that the Illi-
nois Constitution mandated a new remedy of willful and wanton filing
of an unjustified lawsuit 21 5 and applied the elements of malicious pros-
ecution to Dr. Berlin's allegations. The court determined that Dr. Ber-
lin had failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution since he had
not sustained special injury216 and had not alleged favorable termina-
tion of the original suit or that the prior suit had been initiated
maliciously.
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The court in Berlin also rejected the allegation that the patient's
attorney had negligently filed a weak or frivolous case and thus had
breached a duty to Dr. Berlin.218 The court concluded that such an
imposition of liability was against public policy and would create an
insurmountable conflict between the attorney and his client.21 9 The
court also denied the claim of barratry as the defendant's conduct did
not constitute the several acts necessary to sustain such a claim.220
As one commentator has stated, the court of appeals has created a
catch-22 situation within physician countersuits. 22I The court has re-
jected alternate theories of recovery on the basis that the physician had
the available remedy of malicious prosecution, and in a few circum-
stances, abuse of process.222 Yet, malicious prosecution is hardly a
readily available cause of action since Illinois and other minority juris-
dictions restrict the possibility of success by requiring special injury.
D. STOPK4 v LESSER
This restriction went unquestioned until Stopka v. Lesser.223 The
physician in Stopka, who had never treated the plaintiff in the original
malpractice suit, filed a malicious prosecution and negligence action
215. Id. at 950-51, 381 N.E.2d at 1374.
216. Id. at 946, 381 N.E.2d at 1371. The court stated that damage to reputation, mental
anguish, time away from practice and increased premiums are common to all malpractice
defendants.
217. Id. at 947, 381 N.E.2d at 1372.
218. Id. at 952-53, 381 N.E.2d at 1376.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 955-56, 381 N.E.2d at 1377.
221. Reuter, Physician Countersuits: A Catch-22, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 203 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Reuter].
222. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I11. App. 3d 940, 950, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1374 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 828, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 947 (1979).
223. 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980).
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against the attorney in the prior suit. Dr. Stopka alleged that if the
attorney had consulted hospital records available to him though dis-
covery, he would have known that the physician had no connection
with the attorney's client.224 Although the court denied the physician's
claim stating that he had not demonstrated any special injury, the court
did so reluctantly. 225 The court stated that despite its own reservations,
it was compelled to hold that the injury allegation failed to satisfy the
current special injury requirements. 22
6
The Stopka court advocated the need for reassessment of the Illi-
nois special damage requirement. According to the court,
An attorney who files a clearly meritless suit should not be protected.
At present, a majority of American jurisdictions do not condition re-
covery for wrongful litigation upon proof of extraordinary injury.
We believe a reassessment of the special damages requirement in this
jurisdiction is appropriate. It should result in the establishment of an
alternative that would impose a meaningful duty upon attorneys to
ascertain whether the party sued is possibly liable for a wrong com-
mitted and, absent any exigency, where that possibility does not exist,
to effectively deter meritless litigation by providing a recovery from
the attorney to the victim without the requirement of special
damages. 2
2 7
The court urged that the public policy of open access to the courts
would not be offended by a requirement that attorneys investigate
whether a defendant in fact treated the patient. The court reasoned
that the judicial system should not set up and maintain an inequitable,
artificial standard which can permit unprincipled attorneys to file mer-
itless lawsuits. In fact, the court exhorted that a modification of the
special injury rule could act as a restraint to the rampant increase in
meritless lawsuits since it is obvious that the special injury standard has
failed to do so.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although a malicious prosecution action has not been appealed to
the Illinois Supreme Court since Stopka was decided, the needed re-
forms of this action are long overdue. The supreme court needs to re-
examine the policy consideration it has adopted, as well as the lack of
support for its contention regarding the harm a more liberal attitude
224. Id. at 324, 402 N.E.2d at 782.
225. Id. at 326-27, 402 N.E.2d at 784.
226. Id. at 326, 402 N.E.2d at 783-84. The physician in Slopka alleged damage to reputation,
mental anguish, loss of time due to defense preparation and increased medical malpractice premi-
ums. Id. at 324, 402 N.E.2d at 782.
227. Id. at 326-27, 402 N.E.2d at 784 (footnotes omitted).
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will foster. The court has adopted the reasons for limiting malicious
prosecution actions by judicial notice only and has not supported it by
practical results. In reconsidering its stand concerning the elements of
malicious prosecution, the court should consider the alternatives rec-
ommended by various commentators.
One worthwhile recommendation has been the abolishment of the
favorable termination requirement.228 This alternative would provide
the physician with a less expensive and more immediate remedy of a
cross-claim. It could also deter the initiation of groundless claims. The
concern over prejudicing the plaintiff in the original suit, the need for a
predetermination of the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the prior
suit, as well as the conflict of inconsistent judgments, could easily be
avoided by delaying the counterclaims until the disposition of the origi-
nal claim.
It is unlikely, however, that the courts would alter the favorable
termination standard, because, as one commentator has noted,229 this
requirement is firmly entrenched in both the majority and minority ju-
risdictions after many years of case law. A more probable source of
change would be the legislature. In fact, the Washington legislature
has already made this innovation by eliminating the requirement of
favorable termination.2
30
A second alternative, also requiring legislative action, would be
the adoption of certificate of merit similar to that required in Califor-
nia.231 In California, the plaintiffs attorney must file a certificate on or
before the date of service on any defendant 232 which states that the
attorney has reviewed the facts, has consulted with another physician
regarding the defendant's professional conduct and has concluded that
the case is meritorious. 233 The case may result in a demurrer or the
attorney may be liable for disciplinary measures for any violation of
228. Effective Attack, supra note 5 1, at 656, 684. See also, Groundless Litigation, supra note 33,
at 1233.
229. Reuter, supra note 219, at 236.
230. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.350 (Supp. 1978). The statute makes no reference to the
fact that Washington is a minority jurisdiction or to the requirement for interference with person
or property. The statute does remove the requirement for favorable termination and has allowed
a countersuit to be brought as a cross-complaint in the original action.
231. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 411.20 (West 1981). The Section is to be repealed in Janu-
ary, 1984, in accordance with its own provisions; Id. § 411.306); Countersuit, supra note 119, at
760. See generally, Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 1077-84.
232. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 411.30(a) (West 1981).
233. The physician can also declare that he was unable to complete such steps due to the
expiration of the statute of limitations (41 1.30(b)(2)) or was unable to obtain such verification after
three good faith attempts with three separate experts. (411.30(b)(3)).
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the provision of this section.234 This requirement would help insure
that groundless suits were not filed without investigation or evidence to
support the allegation of negligence.
Changes which are readily within the realm and authority of the
Illinois Supreme Court are those suggested by the Stopka court regard-
ing the duty of attorneys to investigate prior to commencing a suit.
23 5
This duty would not conflict with the attorney's obligation to his client
and would protect the defendant's rights, while guaranteeing the pub-
lic's desire to curb spurious claims. As stated in Stopka, the actions of
unprincipled attorneys who fail to reasonably investigate, and the re-
sulting meritless lawsuits, should not be fostered.236  The Illinois
Supreme Court should employ the Stopka recommendations and elimi-
nate the special injury requirement, or at the very least, expand this
standard of damage to include damage to professional reputation. This
modification would provide an equitably remedy to all while still pre-
serving the public policy considerations the minority jurisdiction courts
seem to cherish so strongly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The anomaly of the minority jurisdiction requirement of special
injury must be cured. The courts must accept that the fears they have
maintained regarding the liberalization of malicious prosecution have
not occurred in the majority jurisdictions. There has not been a wide-
spread plague of physician countersuits in the majority jurisdictions,
but rather, the minority jurisdictions have maintained an unfair artifi-
cial barrier, special injury, to deny recovery for the casualties of spuri-
ous suits. The courts have articulated the need for balancing of
interests between the plaintiff and the public and those of the defendant
who has suffered the burdens of an illegitimate suit. However, it is time
that the scales of justice be truly balanced and unjustly accused mal-
practice defendants be given an adequate opportunity to seek judicial
redress for their wrongs. The courts have stressed the need to maintain
open access to the courts for all, and yet, have blocked recovery for
these defendants. It is time that the courts truly open their doors, not
only for the vindication of plaintiffs' rights, but also for the defendants
who frequently suffer the onerous burdens of a maliciously prosecuted
suit.
234. Id. at § 411.30(g).
235. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
236. Stopka v. Lesser, 82 IU. App. 3d 323, 326, 402 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1980).
